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India: Implementing Sex Equality Through Law
Martha C. Nussbaum*

I. INTRODUCTION
India has a long tradition of attaching profound importance to equality.
Addressing some especially entrenched and dramatic inequalities of dignity, material
well-being, and political empowerment-deriving from the traditional caste hierarchy,
from discrimination against minority religious communities, and from pervasive
traditions of sex hierarchy in all the major religions and cultural groups-the
constitutional framers made bold and decisive commitments to a range of human
rights, liberties, and equalities. The Preamble states that the People of India commit
themselves to secure to all citizens: 'justice, social, economic and political; Liberty of
thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equality of status and of opportunity;
and to promote among them all Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and
the unity and integrity of the Nation:" In many respects the nation's legislative and
judicial traditions have pursued these commitments, especially in seeking the full
equality of the previously subordinated groups.
On the other hand India remains the scene of striking inequalities, sometimes
shaky liberties, and a sometimes threatening absence of fraternity. Literacy rates
remain around 65 percent for men and 40 percent for women. Women hold only 6.7
percent of seats in Parliament, and only one seat (out of twenty-six) on the Supreme
Court. Women still have a difficult time protecting their bodily integrity, whether
against domestic violence (marital rape is not a crime and police rarely enforce laws
against domestic violence), or against rape outside the home (a woman's sexual history
is still relevant evidence in rape trials). Economic well-being still too frequently follows
traditional lines of caste, class, and sex. Violence along lines of caste and religion
remains a common feature of life in many regions of the nation.
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Following the complex history of the struggle for human rights through law in
India thus provides a fascinating study of the prospects and problems for
implementation of international human rights norms in a parliamentary democracy,
against background traditions of entrenched inequality. This Article will consider the
ways in which domestic political processes have implemented, or failed to implement,
rights that are important to the international human rights debate-in one case
responding to the stimulus of an international treaty, but often enacting ideals already
explicit in the national Constitution.
I focus on sex equality and on a range of rights of particular salience for women
because this focus proves a valuable way to understand the workings of the political
process more generally, its pitfalls, and what citizens may reasonably hope from it. I
focus on the role of law, rather than on the diverse efforts of administrative agencies,
non-governmental organizations ('NGOs"), and movements and groups of many
kinds; therefore I tell only one part of the story of women's empowerment. Law is not
a profession particularly held in honor in India, and thus feminists tend to have lower
expectations from law than they do in the United States. If we can show that,
nonetheless, considerable progress toward sex equality has been made through law,
this finding will suggest (correctly, in my view) that there has been even more
significant progress in other domains.
This story of internal reform through law is significant because today people who
are deeply committed to international human rights differ profoundly over the
appropriate strategies to implement and maintain these rights. Some follow Kant in
defending national sovereignty and opposing any serious intervention, in the name of
human rights, into the affairs of another nation. Usually these Kantians also share
Kant's own optimism that democratic states, left to their own devices, and exposed to
the moral suasion of the international community, will become progressively more
enlightened, and come to treat humanity in the person of all their citizens as an end, in
the ways international human rights norms spell out. At the other extreme are those
who ultimately favor a rather thick structure of international governance, more or less
statelike, that would have the power to enforce international human rights norms.
These people are convinced that human rights are too urgent and non-negotiable to
be left to the vagaries of the democratic political process in each nation.
This Article will use the case of sex equality in India to argue for an intermediate
position. Usually, and on balance, I shall argue, the Kantian position is the wisest:
norms are meaningful and stable only when they are adopted freely from within.
Moreover, the nation is the largest unit we currently have that is sufficiently
accountable to people's voices to be a legitimate vehicle of their most important
concerns. On the other hand, there is much to be said about what nations do well and
not so well in this area, and the case of India does provide occasion for criticism of
certain forms of democratic procedure as ineffective safeguards of fundamental
liberties. It also shows that international documents and the pressures they supply are
extremely valuable prods to the internal democratic process of nations seeking to

V0(.2 No.1

7ndia: 7ImnementingSex equafty Trougb Law

equalize previously unequal groups. Finally, I will grant that there are some cases in
which a thin but serious set of international institutions, able to impose sanctions,
should indeed intervene in domestic affairs-though not, I believe, in any case we
have yet seen in India since Independence.
I begin by setting out some basic facts about the structure of the Indian system,
and the ways in which basic rights are addressed in the domestic framework. In
Section III, I discuss the problems for sex equality and other important human rights
created by the system of personal laws, separate for each of the major religions, that
govern family law, property, and inheritance. In Sections IV and V, I examine some
outstanding instances of progress toward both sex equality and major liberties
through judicial review of statutes and a tradition of substantive due process. In
Section VI, I examine an important sexual harassment case in which human rights
norms in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women ("CEDAW") were held to be binding on the nation. In Section VII, I
consider another important legal source of women's empowerment, the reservation of
seats for women in local panchayats or councils, and the controversy over extending
these reservations to the national parliamentary level. I condude with some reflections
about the prospects for progress on human rights through domestic political action.
II. THE INDIAN DEMOCRACY: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
India's Constitution, adopted in 1950, establishes a parliamentary liberal
democracy. The primary legislative body is the Lok Sabha (House of the People). The
Constitution provides for a Supreme Court, with a Chief Justice and (initially) no
more than seven other Justices (now twenty-five others, who do not all sit
simultaneously, but are divided into panels), and also for High Courts in the various
States. The Justices of the Supreme Court are currently appointed by a collegium of
senior Justices. There are numerous complaints that the judiciary is insufficiently
representative of India's diverse population. The first woman was appointed only in
1990, and typically (as currently) there is but a single token woman on the Court. In
2000, a crucial sex equality case pertaining to the Muslim community was heard by a
bench consisting of five Judges, of which none was a woman and none belonged to any
minority community.
The role of the Supreme Court has evolved over the years in the direction of
greater authority and independence. Jawarhalal Nehru, fearing that a conservative
judiciary might frustrate progressive social goals, seems to have favored parliamentary
sovereignty and a limited role for the Court. Nonetheless, he also accepted a system in
which the Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of a group of Fundamental
Rights that form Section III of the Constitution. These rights cannot be amended by
a majority vote of Parliament. A struggle over the status of the Fundamental Rights
has been waged on and off since Independence.

Spring 2o0i

CbicagojournafofInternationa(Law

The primary focus of the struggle has been the amending power of Parliament.
Amendments that alter the Constitution's "essential features" or "basic structure" (for
example, the holding of fair and free elections) are held unconstitutional under the
Supreme Court's 1973 decision, KesbavanandaBbarati.2 In certain specific areas of state
action, however, pertaining to material redistribution, the Directive Principles of State
Policy (which will shortly be described) might on occasion override fundamental
rights subject to judicial review. Although this system was temporarily disrupted by
Mrs. Indira Gandhi during the Emergency, it was restored after her ouster, and today
the ideas ofjudicial review and of the "essential features" have widespread acceptance.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have held the Kesbavananda idea of "essential
features" to include the rule of law, secularism and federalism, free and fair elections,
andjudicial review itself.
Thus the Fundamental Rights play a central role in constitutional jurisprudence,
in conjunction with the crucial idea of "essential features." These Fundamental Rights,
although in many ways comparable to (and influenced by) the US Bill of Rights, are
both more numerous and explicit than those recognized in the US Constitution.
Their formulation is typically positive ("All citizens shall have the right . .. ") rather
than negative, in terms of what the state may not do. The account of each right
includes a great deal of detail, designed to resolve controversy in advance. The list of
explicit entitlements is correspondingly detailed, including matters, such as the
freedom of travel and the right to form labor unions, that US constitutional law has
arrived at by judicial interpretation of more generally specified rights.
Article 13 of the Constitution explicitly invalidates all "laws in force" that are
inconsistent with the list of Fundamental Rights-although, as we shall see, it
remains disputed whether "laws in force" includes the personal laws.
Section IV of the Constitution is a set of Directive Principles of State Policy:
unenforceable aspirational guidelines that should be goals for governmental action.
These include such general matters as the promotion of good nutrition, humane
working conditions, and the economic interests of traditionally subordinated groups.
But they also include some much more concrete matters, including one of special
importance to women. Article 44 states that "The state shall endeavour to secure for
the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India."' This provision
came to be entered among the Directive Principles because there was insufficient
agreement to put it into an enforceable section of the Constitution.
The issue of sex equality was much discussed during the drafting of the
Constitution. Nehru and his law minister B. R. Ambedkar (himself a lower-caste
man) were explicitly and deeply committed to the abolition of inequalities based on
caste and sex. The Fundamental Rights were drafted so as to reflect this emphasis.
2. 60 AIR SC1461 (1973).

3. India Const, Art 44,available online at <http://alfa.nic.in/consr/po4044.hml>.
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Article 14 guarantees to all persons equality before the law and the equal protection of
the laws. Article 15 prohibits State discrimination on grounds of"religion, race, caste,
sex, place of birth or any of them." Article 17 abolishes untouchability and the
practices associated with it. Other rights that are highly relevant to sex equality
include Article 13 (invalidating all laws inconsistent with the Fundamental Rights);
Article 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment); Article 19 (protecting
freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, freedom of travel, freedom
of residence, and freedom to form labor unions); Article 21 (stating that no citizen
shall be deprived of life or liberty "except according to procedure established by law");
Article 23 (prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labor); and Article 25
(freedom of conscience and religion).
The understanding of equality in the Constitution is explicitly aimed at securing
substantive equality for previously subordinated groups, and is designed to ward off
merely formal understandings of equality that have, in the US context, been used to
oppose affirmative action. Article 15 states that "Nothing in this article shall prevent
the State from making any special provision for women and children," and that
"Nothing in this article ... shall prevent the State from making any special provision
for the advancement of any socially and educationally backvard classes of citizens or
for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes." Similar clauses appear in Article
16 (equality of opportunity in public employment) and in Article 19 (various other
rights and liberties). The Indian tradition (extending back to the early 20th century) is
strongly in favor of quotas and other affirmative action measures for deprived groups.
In short, the framers understood the goal of equality in terms of an end to systematic
hierarchy and discrimination, based on both caste and sex.
It should be observed at the outset that the Indian Constitution was in some
crucial respects not democratic. In a nation with such low literacy rates, any gathering
of highly educated people is non-representative, and the Indian framers were dearly
an elite, usually by wealth and class as well as by education. (Ambedkar's role was thus
vitally important in making the presence of the lower castes a real part of the
constitutional process.) Certainly that was true of women: womens issues were
debated endlessly, with almost no women present. The elitism was that of a
progressive liberal group who was determined to eradicate entrenched inequalities.
Today, when the legislature is much more genuinely representative, and caste-based
and regional parties play an important political role, there is much less support for
some fundamental features of the Constitution than there was in 1950. The Bharatiya

Janata Party ("BJP") evidently wants to alter one of the Constitution's most basic
features, the equal standing of the religions, in favor of a Hindu state; and, as we shall
see below, crucial measures protective of sex equality are vociferously denounced by
some of the caste-based parties. Thus the evolution of the democracy provides a
classic case study of the tension between the 'liberal" and the "democracy" in "liberal
democracy." I shall argue below that a strong entrenchment of fundamental liberties

Spring 2oo1

Cbicagojourna of Internationa(Law

and a correspondingly strong role for judicial review are important in order to retain
the original commitments to central human rights.
III. SEx EQUALITY AND PERSONAL LAWS

Although the Constitution protects sex equality and free choice of religion, it
also retains plural systems of religious personal law (Muslim, Hindu, Parsi, and
Christian). These systems govern property law and inheritance, as well as family law
(marriage and divorce, maintenance, child custody, etc.). This decentralized situation
dates back to the Raj, when the British codified commercial and criminal law for the
nation as a whole, but, in the spirit of divide and rule, encouraged the maintenance of
separate spheres of civil law in non-commercial areas, and actually codified Hindu law
themselves (since it existed in a plural decentralized condition). At Independence
many leading politicians favored a Uniform Civil Code. However, in the wake of the
bitter sentiments that followed the violence of the Partition riots of 1947, Muslims
who remained in India justly feared that they would become second-class citizens, and
strongly insisted on retaining their own legal system. (Interestingly, Muslim clerics
had strongly opposed partition and supported a united India.) Because of the strong
Muslim opposition to a Uniform Code, it was thought expedient to shelve that
proposal for the time; it was therefore placed in the non-enforceable Directive
Principles of State Policy. (Article 44 states that "The State shall endeavour to secure
for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.")
For a time in the 1970s, support for a Uniform Code was growing, and many
Muslims supported it. However, as shown below, the backlash occasioned by the
Shah Bano judgment began to reverse that trend. More recently, the rise to power of
the BJP, for whom Uniform Code would surely mean Hindu Code, has caused backpedaling among all progressive people. It is unlikely that a Uniform Code will be
achieved any time soon, unless the BJP should win an outright majority and
implement plans of declaring India a Hindu nation. This would be an extremely
unfortunate way for the goal of a Uniform Code, in other ways desirable, to come
about.
All the systems have gross sex inequalities. Thus, one might suppose that they
would automatically be unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment, which
declares that all "laws in force" that contradict fundamental rights are null and void.
However, in 1952, in State of Bombay v Narasu Appa Mali,4 the Bombay High Court
held that the term "laws in force" in that Amendment does not include the personal
laws. They argued that the very presence of Article 44 was a recognition of the
continued existence of personal laws; they also argued that untouchability was
explicitly abolished by Article 17, and that the framers would not have needed this

4. 39 AIR Born 84 (1952).
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Article had they intended to apply general equal protection guarantees to the personal
laws. (It is significant that the case involved a Hindu man who challenged the illegality
of bigamous marriage, pointing to the continued legality of polygamy for Muslims and
challenging the prohibition on equal-protection grounds. Thus the Court may have
thought of itself as acting in a progressive and feminist fashion.)
Thus proponents of sex equality must address this issue within each separate
religious system, and feminists have persistently sought to do so, with varying success.
A. HINDu LAv

A major reform of Hindu law began in 1951, when, after great resistance,
Parliament finally debated the Hindu Code Bill. The debate was tumultuous, and the
provisions of the Bill were eventually adopted only in 1954-1956. Backed by
Ambedkar (who ultimately resigned over the 1951 failure to adopt the BiUll), the Bill
granted Hindu women a right to divorce, removed the option ofpolygamous marriage
for men, raised the legal age of consent to marriage, and granted women more nearly
equal property rights. The Bill, however, leaves much work to be done if full equality
for women is to be achieved, and many of the mainstream constitutional cases
described in Sections III and IV pursue these further issues.
B. CHRISTIAN LAW

Christian law contains inequalities regarding property and marriage and divorce.
The issue of succession law, at least for one state, was dramatically raised in the case of
Mary Roy v State of Kerala.7 Christians in Kerala were governed, in property matters, by
the Travancore Christian Act,8 under which daughters inherit only one-fourth the
share of sons-a portion of each daughter's inheritance goes to the Christian church.
Mrs. Roy challenged the Act on constitutional grounds of sex equality. The Supreme
Court ruled in her favor, but in a narrow and constitutionally uninteresting way. On a
narrow technical basis the court held that the Travancore Christian Act had been
superseded by the Indian Succession Act (the secular law of property), which gives
equal shares to daughters and sons. The court thus avoided taking any stand on the
constitutionality of the law. Even this ruling was highly controversial (in part because

5. See the excellent and detailed account of these reforms in Archana Parashar, Wonen and Famiy La,
Reform in India: Uniform Civil Code and Gender Equality (Sage 1982). In what follows I do not discuss
the Parsi system, which has not undergone any very interesting reform process. For a more derailed
account, see my article on India in Bev Baines, ed, Constitutions of : WorU a.. Wvrn
(forthcoming).
ermrnt: Th.:
6. See the longer account of his role in Martha Nussbaum, Wonen and Hurnan Dcre
CapabilitiesApproach, ca 3 (Cambridge 2000).
7. 73 AIR SC 1011 (1986). Mary Roy is the mother ofprize-winning novelist Arundhati Roy.
8. The state of Kerala unites the former princely ldngdoms of Cochin and Travancore.
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the Court made the change retroactive to 1951, thus jeopardizing many existing
estates). Christian clerics of all the major denominations denounced the Court from
the pulpit.
More recently, however, the Christian community has shown interest in serious
internal reform, and has provided an interesting example of how sex equality may be
promoted through internal change-with the assistance of some state High Court
decisions. Christians in India have been governed by the combined provisions of the
Christian Marriage Act of 1825 and the Indian Divorce Act of 1869. According to
these laws, men may get a divorce only on grounds of adultery. Women are even more
constrained: they need to prove additional grounds of desertion or cruelty. In the
1980s, Christian women's groups began a campaign to get the support of all the major
Christian denominations for much-needed reform. But differences of opinion between
the Churches stalled the process, leading to some remarkable anomalies. For example,
in 1983 cruelty to wives was made a criminal offense, and yet it still was not sufficient
for a Christian woman to get a divorce.
The law was therefore challenged before relevant state High Courts. In 1995, in
Anmini Ej v U01,9 and in the similar case of Mary Sonia Zacbariab v U0I, the Kerala
High Court declared the relevant provisions of the law unconstitutional:
The life of a Christian wife who is compelled to live against her will, though in name
only, as the wife of a man who hates her, has cruelly treated her and deserted her,
putting an end to the matrimonial relation irreversibly, will be a sub-human life
without dignity and personal liberty. It will be a humiliating and oppressed life,
without the freedom to remarry and enjoy
in
*i the normal course. It will be a life
without the freedom to uphold the dignity of the individual in all respects as ensured
by the Constitution of India in the Preamble and Article 21. Section 10 . . 10(is]
highly harsh and oppressive and as such arbitrary and violative of Article 14....
The Bombay High Court soon gave a similar opinion in a case in which the
plaintiffs were represented by leading feminist advocate Flavia Agnes. The reform
campaign rapidly gathered strength, and in 1994 a consensus was reached among the
Catholic Bishops' Conference and the National Council of Churches, supporting a
reformed Christian Marriage Bill. The bill was eventually drafted by the Law
Commission as the Christian Marriage Bill 2000. It will shortly be introduced into
Parliament.
The new bill both equalizes and liberalizes the grounds for divorce-the grounds
are the same for men and women and divorce is allowed by mutual consent. It
provides for equitable maintenance and an equitable division of marital property. A
number of problems, however, remain. A Christian marriage is defined as a marriage
between two Christians; no provision is made for cases in which only one party is
Christian. The Bill retains an archaic and cumbersome procedure for divorce, by

9. 82 AIR Ker 252 (1995).
10. Id at 252-53.
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which two decrees are required, a provisional decree and, no less than six months later,
a final decree. Feminists have criticized the extension of maintenance payments to
husbands, as reflecting an unacceptably formal conception of equality. They also
question the provision by which damage suits may be brought against any person who
has committed adultery with one of the divorcing spouses. In addition, some of the
arrangements for property are vague and badly worded. Nonetheless, the Bill
represents major progress in the area of sex equality, and shows that this progress is
possible within the personal law framework, through a combination of judicial and
legislative action. It is unfortunate that the cumbersome system results in long delays
in implementing reform: although the Christian community itself agreed to reform in
1994, it still has not taken place.
C. MUSLIM LAW
The Ulema (Muslim authority) became concerned, early in the 20th century, that
Muslims in certain areas were following local customary law rather than the shariat,
and thus rich landowners were leaving their entire estates to male heirs, rather than
giving all heirs due shares as specified by Islamic law (women's shares are not fully
equal). They introduced a bill in 1987 to make Islamic law uniform throughout India,
citing the improvement of the situation of women as one of the major reasons for the
Bill. It was also made clear that Muslim women had expressed strong support for the
Bill. Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League, stated, in support of the Bill, that "the
economic position of woman is the foundation of her being recognized as equal of
man and share the life of man to the fullest extent:' However, the final bill as adopted
allowed individuals a choice between the sbariat and customary law with regard to
adoption, wills, and legacies, and the Bill exempted agricultural land from its
provisions. Thus many inequalities remained to be addressed.
In 1939, the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act was introduced in order to
improve the prevailing situation of Muslim women with regard to marriage and
divorce. Although the Koran expressly permits women to seek a divorce in especially
grave cases, the Hanafi school of interpretation, followed at the time by most Muslims
in India, gave few alternatives to women with the exception of apostasizing from
Islam, which was held to be a valid way to dissolve the marriage. Because many
women were in fact leaving Islam for this reason, concern mounted within the Muslim
leadership. The new Act authorized Muslim judges to dissolve a marriage at a
woman's request, following the Maliki school of interpretation in this instance. The
statement attached to the Act spoke of the "unspeakable misery to innumerable
Muslim women in British India" caused by the current situation. The Muslim League,
however, would not agree with the ULema that only Muslim judges should have the
right to dissolve a Muslim marriage; thus the final form in which the Act passed
(which allowed dissolution by non-Muslim judges) was highly unsatisfactory to the
Ulema. The Act did unquestionably improve the situation of women in many respects;
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on the other hand, by removing the option of divorce by apostasy, it also closed a
relatively painless exit route.
At the time of Independence, there was interest in reforming Islamic personal
law to parallel the reforms of Hindu law introduced under the Hindu Code Bill.
However, the bitter divisions between the communities after Partition made this too
difficult a matter to undertake; thus Islamic personal law was not reformed in any
serious way to deal with the remaining issues of sex inequality. Thus, polygamy
remains to this day a legal option for Muslim men, although it is exercised relatively
rarely (about 5 percent of marriages), and largely by wealthier men. Today, the
situation of the Muslim minority remains so threatened (and more so today than
twenty years ago) that it is exceedingly difficult to seek any reform of these laws
without appearing to support the anti-Muslim feelings and rhetoric of the Hindu
fundamentalists.
Especially contentious has been the situation with regard to divorce and
maintenance, which occasioned a major judicial/legislative crisis at the time of the
notorious Sbab Bano" decision. Muslim men are able to divorce their wives summarily,
by simply pronouncing the triple "talaq." Women are entitled to claim only the dowry,
or mebr, that they had brought into the marriage, and no further maintenance.
Because this left many Muslim women in desperate circumstances, women had found
a remedy through the Criminal Code, which is uniform for all India. Section 125 of
the Code forbids a man "of adequate means" to permit various close relatives,
including (by special amendment in 1973) an ex-wife, to remain in a state of
"destitution and vagrancy." Many women divorced under Muslim law had been able to
win grants of maintenance under this Section; the recognition of ex-wives as relations
under the Section was introduced explicitly for this purpose (and was objected to by
members of the Muslim League on grounds of religious free exercise).
In Madhya Pradesh in 1978, an elderly Muslim woman named Shah Bano was
thrown out of her home by her husband, a prosperous lawyer, after forty-four years of
marriage. (The occasion seems to have been a quarrel over inheritance between the
children of Shah Bano and the children of the husband's other wife.) As required by
Islamic law, he returned her marriage portion, Rs. 3000 (about $60 by today's
exchange rates). Following what was by then a common practice, she applied for relief
under Section 125. The case found its way to the Supreme Court.12 Deciding in Shah
Bano's favor and awarding her a maintenance of Rs. 180 per month (about $4), Chief
Justice Chandrachud, a Hindu, wrote a lengthy opinion, both criticizing Islamic
practices and interpreting Islamic texts on his own hook to show that this grant of
maintenance was consistent with Islamic norms. The rhetoric of the opinion was most
11.

Mohammed Abmed Khan v Sbab Bano Begum & Otbers, 72 AIR SC 945 (1985).

12. See the full collection of documents pertaining to this case in Asghar Ali Engineer, ed, The Shah Bano
Controversy (Oriet Longman 1987); see also Women and Human Development, ch 3 (cited in note 6).
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unfortunate: the ChiefJustice cited a British commentary on the Koran in support of
the proposition that the "fatal point in Islam is the degradation of woman." He also
stated, "Undoubtedly, the Muslim husband enjoys the privilege of being able to
discard his wife whenever he chooses to do so, for reasons good, bad, or indifferent.
Indeed, for no reason at all." Perhaps worst of all, he denigrated sacred text, saying,
'To the Prophet is ascribed the statement, hopefully wrongly, that 'Woman was made
from a crooked rib, and if you try to bend it straight, it will break; therefore treat your
wives kindly.""n
The high publicity given to this contemptuous opinion produced a most
unfortunate reaction. Up to this time, there was broad support in the Muslim
community for sex equality and even for the goal of a Uniform Civil Code. Women
had been winning grants of maintenance with no interference from the Ulema. But
now much of the Muslim community, feeling its honor slighted and its civic position
threatened, rallied round the cause of denying women maintenance. Women were
barely consulted when statements were made about what Indian Muslims wished and
thought; an impression was created by the ULetna that all Muslims disagreed with the
judgment. Shah Bano herself was ultimately led to recant her views and to state (in a
pitiful statement signed with her thumbprint) that she now understands that her
salvation in the next world depends on her not pressing her demand for maintenance.
Meanwhile the Muslim leadership persuaded the government of Rajiv Gandhi to
pass a law, the Muslim Women's (Protection after Divorce) Act of 1986, which
deprives all, and only, Muslim women of the opportunity to win maintenance under
the Criminal Code. The Government never consulted with other segments of the
community; they treated the Ulemna as the voice of the whole community. Muslim
women expressed outrage. One activist stood on the steps of Parliament the day the
1986 law was passed and said, "If by making separate laws for Muslim women, you are
trying to say that we are not citizens of this country, then why don't you tell us dearly
and unequivocally that we should establish another country-not Hindustan or
Pakistan but Auratstan (women's land).' 1 4 Hindu men, meanwhile, complained that
the new law discriminates against Hindus, giving Muslim males "special privileges." In
the aftermath of the Muslim Women's Bill, many divorced Muslim women are
leading lives of poverty. Worse still, the destitution of these women has had the effect
of crippling their children's education, as children who would otherwise be in school
are put to work supporting their mothers. Efforts of women to challenge the new law
on grounds of religious non-discrimination (by petition to the Supreme Court) have

13. Sbab Bono, 72 AIR SC at 946,947,946.
14. Quoted in Axnrira Chhachhi, Identity Politics. Secularism and Women: a South Asran Perspative, in Zoya
Hasan, ed, ForgingIdentities: Gender, Communities and &,e State in India 74 (Westview 1994). See also

Zoya Hasan, Minority Identity, State Polic and the PoliticalPrcessin ForgingIdentities at 59.
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been unsuccessful: apparently the Court is in retreat from the controversy occasioned
by its role in the Sbab Banojudgment.
The system of personal laws has many severe problems. It creates difficulties not
only for sex equality, but also for freedom of religion (because it makes it so difficult to
change religions) and for non-discrimination on the basis of religion (Muslim women,
for example, lose out on benefits that other women enjoy). Unfortunately but
predictably, male leaders in each religion tend to define their prestige in terms of how
far they can resist changes in their religious traditions; the position of women has
become a focal point for this resistance. Internal reform is resisted because it seems to
signal weakness. Moreover, even when internal reform is successful, as in the case of
the Christian Marriage Bill, the cumbersome nature of the arrangement creates huge
delays and uncertainties for its implementation. Nonetheless, it is likely that internal
reform is the best option for the foreseeable future. In this day of growing Hindu
fundamentalism, Uniform Code really does mean Hindu Code, and the resistance of
the Muslim minority to losing its legal system is comprehensible.
Here we see a very unfortunate and illiberal feature of the Indian democracy as it
currently exists. A system that creates profound inequalities, and serious violations of
several basic constitutional rights, is held in place by the jockeying for position that
obtains among the religion-based parties, and by the fact that women have no
comparable political power base. How might such a system be effectively reformed?
History suggests two remedies, which should work in tandem. On the one hand, there
must be much more attention paid to Fundamental Rights on the part of the courts.
That is what judicial review is supposed to be doing. Judges should not insult the
religions, and they should be especially cautious in dealing with the affairs of a
religious minority. The unfortunate result in Sbab Bano was caused by the rhetoric of
the judicial opinion, not by its content; similar judgments had been commonplace.
The Courts should move decisively to invalidate features of the separate codes that
violate basic constitutional rights, as they were willing to do in the case of the
Christians.
At the same time, it is clear that only giving women greater access to the political
process will ultimately change this situation in a stable way. Through the 73rd and
74th Amendments, 33 percent of the pancbayats seats, or local councils, are reserved
for women. This reform, at first unpopular with many feminists, has proven valuable
in teaching women political skills and including their voices in the political process.
There is broad support for the 85th Amendment, which would establish a similar
system of reservations at the national level. So far, however, although the major parties
say they support the Amendment, it has never been seriously debated, because castebased parties, fearing that they might lose out if the women chosen are largely from
upper castes, create disturbances and rip up the copies of the bill. It is the very success
of grassroots democracy in India that currently blocks yet further democratizing of
the process in a way that would give women greater access and power. Thus the
adoption of the 85th Amendment seems an important part of securing sex equality in
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the Indian context. As more women become involved in politics nationwide, or even
before that time, it would surely be important to appoint more female judges and
more judges with a reflective understanding of women's issues.
One might add one more point. In all the jockeying for position and all the
massive affirmative action that characterizes Indian politics, one group that has never
received any benefits at all is the Muslims. There are reserved seats for scheduled
castes, scheduled tribes, and, now, the Other Backward Castes ("OBCs"); at the local
level, there are reserved seats for women. Improving democratic equality with regard
to the treatment of Muslims would surely be important to any long-term resolution of
the personal-law situation, because it is the legitimate sense of exclusion on the part of
the Muslim community that leads many Muslims to cling so tenaciously to traditional
practices.
IV. EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
In general the understanding of sex equality in the Constitution is not formal,
but substantive: laws are to be evaluated in terms of the idea of equal respect for all
citizens and an end to traditional forms of hierarchy and discrimination. The
jurisprudence interpreting these Articles, however, has a more mixed history.' The
Supreme Court has interpreted Article 14 as a prohibition against "unreasonable"
classifications based on sex. The standard of reasonableness, set out in Budban Choudry
v State of Bibarrequires that "(i) ...
the classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentiation which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from
others left out of the group" and "(ii) ...that differentia must have a rational relation
to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question." These criteria import
a formal idea of equality: only those individuals who are similar need be treated
similarly; it turns away from what appears to have been the original intent of the
Articles, to break down hierarchies founded upon caste and sex. In keeping with this
formal understanding of equality, the clauses of Articles 15 and 16 pertaining to
affirmative measures were initially interpreted by the Court as exceptions to the
(allegedly formal) doctrine of equal treatment articulated within the Articles, rather
than as part of the Articles' substantive doctrine of equality.
The substantive approach to equality, present from the Founding in statements
of Nehru and Ambedkar, and, arguably, plainly expressed in the Constitution's text,
has gradually prevailed in the jurisprudence as well. Under this approach, the sections
of Articles 15 and 16 pertaining to women are not exceptions, but part of the Articles'

15. See the excellent treatment of these questions in Ratna Kapur and Brenda Cossman, Su. -erw S.re
Feminist Engagements With the Law in India, ch 3 (Sage 1996) to which my discussion in this section is
indebted.
16. 42 AIR SC 19,191 (1955).
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articulation of an anti-hierarchical understanding of equality. In Kerala v N. M.
Thomas, the Supreme Court began to articulate this approach, stating:
Though complete identity of equality of opportunity is impossible in this world,
measures compensatory in character and which are calculated to mitigate
surmountable obstacles
to ensure equality of opportunity can never incur the wrath
17
of Article 16 (1).
In the area of restitution of conjugal rights, the substantive approach to equality
has been influentially articulated. This, of course, is a central issue of women's human
rights: for a woman to be forced to return to the conjugal home and undergo
intercourse against her will is a paradigmatic violation of basic dignity and also of
equality. And indeed the Indian tradition analyzes the issue under these two separate
rubrics, as I shall also. Sareetba v T. Venkata Subbaiab'" concerned a popular film actress
whose husband-having been indifferent to her departure until she became rich and
famous-sued her for restitution of conjugal rights under a provision of the Hindu
law of marriage that had its ultimate origins in British ecclesiastical law. The Andhra
Pradesh High Court declared that part of the marriage law unconstitutional, on
grounds of both privacy and sex equality. The High Court stressed the privacy arm of
the argument and it formed the basis for the ultimate reversal by the Supreme Court.
But in the less-noticed equality arm of the argument, Justice Choudary noted that the
law was neutral on its face, applying to either a male or a female spouse. Nonetheless,
he argued that it was discriminatory because of the substantive differences between
the social positions of males and females in marriage. The enforcement of such a
decree, especially given that it may result in the conception of a child, will alter the
wife's life in a way that it could not possibly alter the husband's.
As a result this remedy works in practice only as an engine of oppression to be
operated by the husband for the benefit of the husband against the wife. By treating
the wife and the husband who are inherently unequal as equals, Section 9 of the Act
offends the rule of equal protection of laws. For that reason fit] should therefore be
struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution) 9
Although the decision was overruled (see further in Section IV), this arm of the
argument was neither refuted nor so much as mentioned by the Supreme Court. Its
status in constitutional jurisprudence thus remains unclear. In other areas of law,
however, including divorce, property,' and employment rights, the substantive
approach has generally prevailed.
Inequalities remain in all of these areas, in part because judges appear unaware of
the fact that they are taking for granted a patriarchal view of the family; but they are

17.
18.

63 AIR SC 490, 514 (1976).
70 AIR AP 356 (1983).

19. Id ar 358.
20.

See Bina Agarwal, A Field of One's Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia (Cambridge 1994);
Srimari Basu, Sbe Comes to Take Her Rights: Indian Women, Property, and Propriety(SUNY 1999).
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being gradually eroded. Consider Air India v Nergesb Meerza' in which an air hostess
challenged the different rules pertaining to air hostesses and male stewards on
grounds of sex discrimination. On the one hand, the Court upheld the basic scheme of
classification by sex, holding that air hostesses were a category of workers distinct
from other airline employees. They also upheld the regulation that a hostess may be
fired if she marries within four years after her initial employment, reasoning that this
condition was legitimate in the light of state family planning objectives: mature
women would be more able to make sound decisions regarding pregnancy. On the
other hand, the Court struck down as unconstitutionally unreasonable and arbitrary
(thus, in violation of Article 14) a regulation requiring hostesses to terminate
employment at the time of pregnancy. Here they argued that the difference between
male and female with regard to pregnancy does not license a regulation that "amounts
to compelling the poor air hostess not to have any children and thus interfere with
and divert the ordinary course of human nature." The Court's reasoning contains a
remarkable mixture ofprogressive and traditional elements:
The termination of the services of an Air Hostess under such circumstances is not
only a callous and cruel act but an open insult to Indian womanhood the most
sacrosanct and cherished institution. Such a course of action is extremely detestable
and abhorrent to the notions of a civilised society. Apart from being grossly
unethical, it smacks of a deep rooted sense of utterselfishness at the costof
human values.
os
Notice the complex mixture of progressive and traditional considerations. On
the one hand, the Court holds that the regulation violates equal protection, and
appears to take the woman's situation into account with sympathy. On the other
hand, however, it continues to view woman as a fragile and sacred creature to be put
on a pedestal. One might even see inthe opinion the view that to be an Indian woman
is to be a mother. As a result, the issue of sex discrimination does not emerge with the
clarity that one might have wished.
What does this history suggest? It seems to me that it suggests a considerable
capacity for internal reform and progress on the part, even, of a rather stodgy judiciary
appointed from a relatively narrow segment of Indian society. But it also suggests a
need for judges to become more aware of international debates about women's rights
and other issues pertaining to sex equality, and thus more aware of the assumptions
about family and woman that they bring to the table. It seems likely that if legal
education presented young lawyers and judges with readings critical of patriarchal
assumptions regarding the family, some of these assumptions would have been
criticized by the judges themselves. Certainly it is difficult to imagine a US judge
today writing these things, and surely that is not because the US has a deeper or more
extensive commitment to sex equality than does India. When the thinking of well21. 68 AIR SC 1829 (1981).
22. Idat 1831.
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intentioned and equality-minded judges is archaic and unreflective, legal education
may plausibly be blamed, and its reform may be seen as an important part of securing
a more adequate implementation of constitutional norms.
V. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: LIBERTY AND PRIVACY

When the Constitution was being written, the framers consulted US jurists, in
particular Felix Frankfurter, who warned them of the bad history of substantive due
process in the United States, in the Locbner era, when progressive economic legislation
was invalidated through discovering substantive rights in the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Indian framers therefore tried to avoid
making room for substantive due process by phrasing Article 21 in a way that
suggested that all laws passed by an appropriate procedure would be upheld. Instead
of the US phrase "due process of law" they used the phrase "procedure established by
law," with the intention of suggesting that only procedural irregularities would be
found unconstitutional.23
The Justices of the Supreme Court, however, soon became convinced that there
was an important role for substantive due process to play in the Indian constitutional
tradition. The words "life and liberty" in Article 21 have accordingly been the object of
a very interesting jurisprudential tradition, which has interpreted them to entail not
mere life, but life with dignity (see also section VII). In Gopalan v State of Madras,24 a
case involving allegedly unlawful police detention, two dissenting Justices already
argued that preventive detention was inconsistent with the meaning of "life and
liberty," as well as with the right to movement in Article 19. In 1978, this idea was
recognized by the majority in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India and Anr,' a case in which
Mrs. Gandhi's daughter-in-law moved the court against the impounding of her
passport. The Court held that the rights of Articles 19 and 21 involve the right to
travel abroad. In 1981, in Francis CoralieMullin v Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi,
a case involving a female prisoner who had been denied the right to see her family and
her lawyer, the Supreme Court held that the right to life involves "the right to live
with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of
life.. .and also expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and
commingling with fellow human beings." ' They linked "life" to the idea of human
dignity. In Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation, a case involving the eviction of
poor pavement dwellers, the Court extended this doctrine, stating: "'Life' means
23. I discuss this whole issue in greater derail in Martha Nussbaum, Privacy, Liberty, and Sex Equality: A
Comparative Approach to the Feminist Critique, in E. Sridharan, R. Sudarshan, and Z. Hasan, eds,
ConstitutionalIdeas and PoliticalPractices:Fifty
Years of the Republic (Oxford forthcoming).

24. 37 AIR SC 27 (1950).
25. 65 AIR SC 597 (1978).
26. 68 AIR SC 746,747 (1981).
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something more than mere animal existence. It does not mean merely that life cannot
be extinguished or taken away, except according to procedure established by law. That
is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important aspect of that right is the
right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living.'
During this same period, the Court also held that a right to privacy, modeled on
the right recognized in US constitutional law, was inherent in Article 21. This right
seemed to many Indian jurists an important one for Indian constitutional law to
recognize, both because of its role in protecting women's bodily autonomy and
integrity and because of its other potential uses, especially in plugging a gap created by
the fact that the Indian Constitution has no equivalent of the US Fourth
Amendment, and police surveillance was proceeding unchecked by any constitutional
procedure. The first cases to recognize a right to privacy in connection with Article 21
were cases involving police surveillance. In the first of these, Kharak Singh v State of
UttarPradesb,the dissenters recognized such a right, and in the second, Govind v State
of Madbya Prades,' the majority recognized the right, citing American privacy cases
from a variety of distinct areas, including search and seizure, but also including the
Fourteenth Amendment privacy right cases Griswoldand Roe.'
At issue was a state police regulation, framed in accordance with directives
provided by a national Police Act, according to which people who had a criminal
record or were in other ways suspected of "a determination to lead a life of crime"
could be subject to unannounced domiciliary visits, often in the middle of the night,
and could also be followed and spied on when outside the house. Justices Mathev,
Iyer, and Goswami, citing the 1877 US case Munn v Illinois,a opined that 'liberty" in
Article 21 should be given an expansive interpretation, as incompatible with "an
invasion on the part of the police of the sanctity of a man's home and an intrusion into
his personal security and his right to sleep, which is the normal comfort and a dire
necessity for human existence even as an animal."" The Justices then brought in the
notion of privacy, holding that a right to privacy in one's home is implicated in the
meaning of liberty. Citing the dissent in Kbarak Sing), they held that "in the last resort
a person's house, where he lives with his family, is his 'castle,' that nothing is more
deleterious to a man's physical happiness and health than a calculated interference
,,32
with his privacy....

27. 73 AIR SC 180, 193 (1986).
28. KIarak Sinib v State of Uttar Pradesb, 50 AIR SC 1295 (1963); Gotind v State cf Madhya Pradeb, 62
AIR SC 1378 (1975).
29. Griswold v Connecticut,381 US 479 (1965); Roe vWade, 410 US 113 (1973).
30. 94 US 113 (1877).
31. Govind, 62 AIR SC ar 1382 (quoting KharakSingb).
32. Idat 1382.
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Notice, then, that from the beginning of this privacy jurisprudence the notion of
privacy is coupled with the notion that a (male) householder has the right to control
his functioning in a protected space. And in fact traditional notions of the privacy of
the home, in Indian legal tradition, strongly define the home as a patriarchal sphere of
privilege, in which a man may operate as a king, unconstrained by the reciprocity or
deference he might need to exhibit toward others outside the home. This is the very
aspect of the concept of privacy that feminists have persistently criticized, arguing that
it has been used for centuries to defend male domination over women and children in
the home. Even when the issue was simply surveillance, both inside and outside the
home, the Court felt the need to allude to this powerful Indian (as well as Western)
tradition.
Significantly enough, the Justices understood that the actions of the police
threaten important human liberties even when they are not directed at the "sanctity of
the home." And they meant to call into constitutional question not only the
domiciliary visits, but the whole pattern of police spying." But at this point they
turned to the enumerated liberties of Article 19, holding that the freedom of
movement must also be given an expansive construction. Again citing the dissenters in
Kharak Singh, they opined that it is not "mere freedom to move without physical
obstruction and.., movement under the scrutinizing gaze of the policeman cannot be
free movement." Freedom of movement "must be a movement in a free country, i. e. in
a country where he can do whatever he likes, speak to whomsoever he wants, meet
people of his own choice without any apprehension, subject of course to the law of
social control and that a person under the shadow of surveillance is certainly deprived
of this freedom." Given that the right to be free from surveillance is here extracted
from freedom of movement, it is not entirely clear why the privacy of the home had to
be invoked earlier on. Domiciliary visits seem to be bad in just the way surveillance
outside the home is bad-they deprive a person of liberty to move around, talk to
people, and so on. And again, the Justices knew that privacy is a slippery notion: "The
most serious advocate of privacy must confess that there are serious problems of
defining the essence and scope of the right."" But nonetheless they indulged in a vague
and diffuse rhetoric about the sanctity of the home, and even refer to aspects of
marital sanctity that have no evident connection to the case: "Any right to privacy
must encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home, the family,
marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing."' What does this have to do
with shadowing a person not charged with or even suspected of any concrete crime?
33. The actual holding is complex: they say that it is possible that the whole pattern is unconstitutional,
but for now they will simply hold that the State needs to show a compelling interest in public safety
if it is to apply these procedures to a particular individual.
34. Govind, 62 AIR SC at 1382-83.
35. Id at 1385.
36. Id at 1385.

cud.2 No. I

Inda: 7mpfn enting Sex &juaGty Trou b Law

WuaS&UM

In short, the privacy right carries with it some dubious baggage. It is not
surprising, then, to discover that it has been a slippery notion when we approach the
area of women's sexual autonomy, an area in which even more straightforward ideas of
substantive equality sometimes founder. Let us now return to the Sareetha case, whose
equality aspect I discussed in Section II. Although the equality aspect of Justice
Choudary's opinion' was progressive and interesting in its own right, most of the
attention the case attracted focused on its novel and strongly feminist reading of
Article 21 in terms of a right to privacy. Draving on the US tradition of privacy-right
jurisprudence and explicitly citing Griswold and Roe as precedents, he declared that
Article 21 implies a right to privacy, which must be understood to be implicit in the
meaning of "life and liberty," given that it had already been established (see below)
that "life" means not mere (animal) life, but a properly dignified human life. The
remedy of restitution is "a savage and barbarous remedy, violating the right to privacy
and human dignity guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution."" Although the Justice
admitted that the concept of privacy is hard to pin down, he was satisfied that "any
plausible definition of right to privacy is bound to take human body as its first and
most basic reference for control over personal identity. Such a definition is bound to
include body's inviolability and integrity and intimacy of personal identity, including
marital privacy." 3 Thus a major human right of women, prominently discussed in
international fora and documents, was given recognition for the first time in the
Indian constitutional tradition.

Recognizing a right to bodily integrity under a right to privacy, however, is not
unproblematic. Justice Choudary's reference to "marital privacy" betrays the difficulty.
the traditional concept of "marital privacy" is subversive of women's liberty and bodily
integrity. It is that very concept that makes it so difficult, even today, to get marital
rape criminalized and domestic violence prosecuted.' Surely if what was wanted was a
right to control one's body, that right would much more naturally have been read out
of Article 19's guarantee of freedom of movement, travel, and residence (as the
surveillance cases suggest), or out of the more general notions of "life and liberty"
recognized in the right-to-livelihood cases. Why not, for example, say directly that
Article 21's guarantee of life and liberty involves protection of the very basic right of
sexual autonomy-the right to refuse unwanted sex-without which, as the Judge
eloquently stated, human life is more bestial than human. Why bring privacy into it?.
And indeed, it was with reference to the traditional ideal of the household that
the Justice was eventually overruled. At approximately the same time, a restitution

37.
38.
39.
40.

The title "Jusdce"is used in India for both Supreme Court and state High Court judges.
70 AIRAP 356,356 (1983).
Id at 368.
In Privacy,Liberty I discuss prominent feminist arguments on this poinr, above all, those ofCatharine
Macinnon.
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case was heard in the Delhi High Court. In Harvinder Kaur v Harmander Singb
Cboudbry, the Court argued directly against the Choudary opinion, which had created
a stir, holding that the remedy of restitution was not unconstitutional under either
Article 14 or Article 21.41 The essence of the Delhi argument is that the intimate
nature of marriage makes the application of constitutional principles inappropriate:
Introduction of Constitutional Law in the home is most mapropriate. It is like
introducing a bull in a china shop. It will prove to be a ruthless destroyer of the
marriage institution and all that it stands for. In the privacy of the home and the
married life neither Art. 21 nor Art. 14 have [sic] any place. In a sensitive sphere
which is at once most intimate and delicate the introduction of thebond.
cold principles
of
.
Constitutional Law will have the effect of weakening the marriage
The opinion also insisted that the restitution decree did not really enforce sexual
intercourse and thus could not be counted as a judicial invasion of "marital privacy."
Of course, the opinion itself appealed to the traditional notion of marital privacy in its
judgment that the Constitution should stay out of marriage.
In 1984, in a different case, the Supreme Court sided with the Delhi Court and
against Justice Choudary. Conjugal rights, held the Justices, are "inherent in the very
institution of marriage itself." Quoting from the Law Commission's 1955 report on
the Hindu Marriage Act, they wrote that "the essence of marriage is a sharing of
common life, a sharing of all the happiness that life has to offer and all the misery that
has to be faced in life... Living together is a symbol of such sharing in all its aspects."
The decree of restitution thus "serves a social purpose as an aid to the prevention of
[the] break-up of marriage."
As for the claim that the law violates women's bodily integrity, the Justices
opined that the law contained "sufficient safeguards ... to prevent it from being a
tyranny." In particular, a woman who does not want to obey can always pay a fine,
"provided he or she has properties to be attached." To the appellant's contention that
"in the social reality of the Indian society, a divorced wife would be materially at a
great disadvantage,"15 the Justices say yes, this is correct. Therefore in the particular
case they order the husband to pay maintenance to the wife and to pay the legal costs
of the appeal.
Thus the whole strategy of appeal to Article 21, as a locus of important human
rights for women, was denied. But it seems clear that it was easy to deny it because of
the way in which the alleged right was framed, as a right of privacy. For it was then so
easy to say: "Look at our concept of marital privacy. Surely that concept is threatened
not by a kindly law that helps people live together and work out their differences, but

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

71 AIR Delhi 66 (1984).
Id at 67.
Saroj Rani v Sudarshan Kumar, 71 AIR SC 1562, 1568 (1984).
Id.
Id.
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by the cold hand of Constitutional Law, which enters in to break up the sanctity of
the marital home." It is certainly possible that the Supreme Court would have refused
to recognize any liberty-right for women here, no matter how framed. On the other
hand, in cases dealing with the rights of the homeless and the rights of criminals it had
supported a liberal reading of the general notion of "life and liberty." And surely the
appeal to a concept deeply identified with the allegedly seamless unity of the
patriarchal family, and with the presumption of consent to sex in marriage, did no
good in staving off this result. Both the sex-equality argument (which was totally
ignored by the Supreme Court) and the parallel tradition of interpreting Artide 21 so
as to require 'life with dignity" hold more promise for the interests of women than
does the dubious and equivocal concept of privacy.
I conclude that in this area as in the area of sex equality, patriarchal assumptions
of judges have interfered in some instances to block meaningful recognition of
important human rights for women. But this failure, once again, does not seem to
show any deep impossibility of internal reform of the constitutional tradition. Indeed,
I would argue that the progressive Justice simply chose the wrong constitutional
strategy, thus setting himself up for reversal. Once again, the lack of a theoretical
tradition of discourse about constitutional ideas shows itselfi a legal education that
included consideration of the feminist critique of the right to privacy might have set
Justice Choudary5 on a more productive course. Again, I see an educational failure,
but not a deep failure of democratic processes.
VI. CEDAW AND THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

Article 32 of the Constitution creates a remedy for non-enforcement of rights,
according to which citizens may appeal directly by petition to the Supreme Court to
secure their rights, and the Court may issue writs, directions, and orders designed to
secure enforcement.

In the area of sexual harassment, the petition remedy has led to a major victory
for women's interests. Visbaka v State of Rajastban was brought by petition to the
Supreme Court' by a group of women's groups and NGO's, on the occasion of an
alleged brutal gang rape of a social worker in a village in Rajasthan. The petitioners
argued that they and other working women are unsafe and unprotected from
harassment in the workplace because of the failure of both employers and the legal
system to address this problem. They argued that the sexual harassment of women in
the workplace violates the fundamental constitutional rights of both gender equality
46. Choudary did cite quite a number of articles on the topic, but he seems to have been an autolidacr
and quite unsystematic in his reading.
47. 6 SCC 241 (1997). This case was also the subject of a separate criminal action, and it played no
further role in the petition. Article 32 of the Constitution provides for this procedure in cases
involving violations of Fundamental Rights.
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and 'life and liberty" (under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution). It was also
argued that these violations entailed violations of rights to "practice any occupation,
trade, or business" guaranteed under Article 19. In arguing the case, the petitioners
made repeated reference to the CEDAW, which has been ratified by India, arguing
that the definitions of gender equality in this document "must be read into these
provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to promote the object of the
constitutional guarantee. ' They argued that this way of understanding the binding
force of CEDAW is entailed by Article 51c of the Constitution (among the Directive
Principles of State Policy), which holds that "The State shall endeavour to... foster
respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised people
' Thus it was argued that the account of women's rights in the
with one another.AS
workplace described in CEDAW were binding on India through ratification.
The Court accepted the petitioners' argument, holding that indeed the account
of sexual harassment in CEDAW is binding on the nation, and that the relevant
Constitutional provisions should henceforth be read in the expanded manner
suggested by petitioners, filling in the understanding of the relevant concepts as
described in CEDAW. As in previous jurisprudence, the Court held the right to life
means 'life with dignity," and that the nation has the responsibility of enforcing such
"safety and dignity through suitable legislation."' The Court issued an admirably clear
and comprehensive set of guidelines, closely based on CEDAW, defining sexual
harassment in terms of unwelcomeness and potential job disadvantage and/or
humiliation. Both quid-pro-quo and hostile environment harassment were described
as sex discrimination. The Court then went on to outline preventive measures to be
taken by employers, including notification of the prohibition of all forms of
harassment, establishment of a complaint mechanism, and appropriately set internal
penalties. Internal complaint committees must be headed by a woman and at least half
of their members must be women. In an especially interesting and creative step, the
Court said that in order to prevent undue influence from higher levels in the business
in question, complaint committees must involve a third party, usually an NGO.
Finally, the Court concluded that "The Central/State Governments are requested to
consider adopting suitable measures including legislation to ensure that the, idelines
laid down by this order are also observed by the employers in private sector.p
This important case shows a productive interaction between international
treaties and domestic courts, which has also been seen in other countries. 2 CEDAW

48. Id at 249.
49. Id at 248.
50. Id at 247.

51. Idat 254.
52. Attorney General v Unity Dow, 1992 LRC (Cons) 623 (July2, 1992) (citing CEDAW for authority on
a child's nationality).
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gives domestic activists a blueprint for change that they can take to their own Courts,
in this case achieving the incorporation of CEDAW standards into domestic law. The

role for NGOs in the solution was especially creative. Legislation binding on nongovernmental actors has not yet been passed, and the current political climate does

not appear favorable to it. 3 Nonetheless, Visbaka sets out firmly on a path that can be
followed in other areas in the future, a path that productively combines internal
democratic legitimacy with the external suasion supplied by an international treaty.
VII. A FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE
The history of sex equality in India is not one of unilinear and spectacular
progress. Nonetheless, even with respect to law-a conservative and not particularly
lively segment of Indian institutions-women have achieved substantial progress in
fighting for their human rights. As I have suggested, further progress appears to
depend both on improving the education of lawyers and judges, making them more
attuned to the theoretical dimensions of their enterprise and more aware of feminist
arguments, and also, at the same time, enhancing the political role of women and their
access to the political process. One valuable aid in linking the "top-down" and the
"bottom-up" aspects of Indian reform is the provision that groups or individuals may
approach the Supreme Court by petition. In this way, in Visbaka, a group of
grassroots activists was able to make its concerns known at the highest level of
government.
From this history I tentatively conclude that where there is a decent functioning
democracy in place, internal reform is the appropriate strategy. Even though one may
be impatient with the slow and chaotic movements of this multi-party system, where
increasing democratization often means an increasing role for old patriarchal values, it
would be utterly inappropriate for another nation to act as the beneficent colonial
authority and apply any form of sanctions to promote sex equality as an end. It seems
to me that the limit of what it is appropriate for outside governments to do was shown
very well by the actions of President Clinton in regard to India. In his visit, he drew
attention to womenfs NGOs and to the plight of rural women, giving them
encouragement and suggesting in a vague way that this is the sort of thing the US likes
to aid. He did not condition aid on any specific government action toward women,
nor should he have. Even where a foreign nation uses official channels to fund NGOs
that work on specific social issues (as the governments of Norway, Sweden, and The
Netherlands fund many NGOs that deal with women's literacy), it seems to me that
this action is appropriate only where, as is the case with India, the issue already enjoys

53. For a different approach to the question, through criminal laws relating to womens modesty. e
Martha Nussbaum, The Modesty of Mrs. Bajaj: India'sProtlematicRcute to Sexual HarassmntLaw, in C.
MacKinnon and RL Siegel eds, Directionsin Sexual HarassmentLaw (Yale forthcoming).
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tremendous public support, and one could not plausibly argue that alien values are
being imposed on Indian people. To proceed otherwise is to act as a colonial despot.
India, of course, is a democracy, and a remarkably successful one.' Where we do
not have democracy, there may be a correspondingly larger role for humanitarian
intervention. Even here, however, I would argue that intervention should aim at
bringing about the stable functioning of representative democratic institutions in the
future, as well as, more directly, at the protection of human rights.
Finally, the Indian case contains no atrocities (or, to the extent that atrocities are
present, no more such atrocities than in other well-functioning democracies where
race riots and hate crimes routinely take place, where marital rape is not prosecuted,
and where domestic violence is insufficiently prosecuted)." There are cases of "crimes
against humanity" that I think should indeed be punished by an international tribunal,
and I strongly favor the treatment of mass rapes of women as a crime against
humanity. Thus, ultimately I would favor a thin and decentralized set of international
institutions, with sanctions, to deal with crimes against humanity and to establish
binding standards in areas such as the environment and trade, but also to deal with
trafficking of women and other transnational atrocities. A rape of a woman is a
terrible crime against that woman's human rights no matter where it occurs. Some
may feel that I am insufficiently tough when I insist that India should deal with its
own domestic problem of rape and that only rapes that are part of a war situation
should be dealt with by international tribunals. Nonetheless, I believe that for both
prudential and ethical reasons the route of internal reform is the right route to take in
these matters; and the best role for international treaties, in general, is as pieces of
public persuasion that may help activists and politicians eager to promote a process of
domestic reform.

54. Although one might see some of the party politics as chaotic, it is good to remember that the
electoral difficulties that recently beset the US would have been impossible under the Indian system,
which had faced all these possibilities in advance and adopted a national Election Commission to
resolve difficult situations (in addition to having a uniform system of paper ballots, accessible to both
literate and illiterate voters through pictures of the party symbol).
55. India is one of the few liberal democratic nations that retains the death penalty, but it almost never
uses it; so in that respect as well, some might judge it to be more advanced than the US with regard
to basic human rights.
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